Thimmes v. Utah State University : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Thimmes v. Utah State University : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall K. Edwards; Christensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Appellant.
Sandra L. Steinvoort; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Thimmes v. Utah State University, No. 991099 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2471
1






HAVEN B. HENDRICKS. AND JOHN-





AN APPEAL FROM TWO ORDERS OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT




160 East 300 South. Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City. LIT 841 14-0856
Randall K. Edwards. #3787
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C.
50 South Main. Suite 1500
Salt Lake City. UT 84144






HAVEN B. HENDRICKS. AND JOHN





AN APPEAL FROM TWO ORDERS OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT




160 East 300 South. Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City. IT 841144)856
Randall K. Edwards. #3787
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. PC.
50 South Main. Suite 1500
Salt Lake City. UT 84144
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THIS ACTION
1i AMANDA THIMMES. Appellant/PlaintitT;
2) UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY. Appellee/Defendant;
3) HAVEN B. HENDRICKS. Appcllee/Delendant;
4) JOHN DOES I THROUGH X. Appellees/Defendants (named fictitiously
TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION 1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1
STATEMENT OE THE CASE 2
Nature of the Case 2
Statement of Facts 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13
ARGUMENT 14
POINT I. UNDER UTAH CASE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY.
PLAINTIFF COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BY FILING
HER NOTICE OF CLAIM PRECISELY AS DIRECTED BY
DEFENDANTS' REPRSENTATIVE. THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT ON THE
BASIS OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THI: NOTICE OF CLAIM
STATUTE 14
POINT II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO
REFUSE TO RECONSIDER OR OTHERWISE RELIEVE
PLAINTIFF FROM ITS DECISION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S
CAS!' AFTER PLAINTIFF HAD SHOWN THAT THI- FACTUAL
BASIS UON WHICH THI; DECISION WAS BASED WAS
DEMONSTRABLY FALSI; 20
APPENDIX 24
EXHIBIT A -Order of Dismissal (R. 236-238)
EXHIBIT B -Order On Objection to Proposed Order. Motion for
Reconsideration or. Alternatively, Motion to Altei or Amend
Judgment or to Set Aside Judgment (R. 233-23.^)
EXHIBIT C Memorandum Decision; September 14, 1998 (R. 148-LS] )
EXHIBIT D - Memorandum Decision: November 12. 1998 iR. 231-232
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ^S
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, at 802 (Utah 1985) 17
Hill Brown Really, Inc. v. Ahholl, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977) 2
Bisehe! v. Merrill, 907 P.2d 275 (I'tah App. 1995} . 11.13. 15. 16. 17. 19. 22. 23
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Slate, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) 2
Hackjonlv. Utah bower cV- Li^hi, 740 P.2d 1281. 1284-1 285 (Utah 1992) .. 20
Neulerhauscr Blders. & Dew Corp. v. Campbell 2
824P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
Rice v. (iramie School Disirici, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) 16
Schnrlz v. BMW of No. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) 2
1'ilyv. I'dx, 893 P.2d 1097. 1099 (Utah App. 1995) 23
Warren v. brovo Ciiv Corp., 838 P.2d 1125. 1129 (Utah 1992) 16
Statutes
UCA 63-30-1 1 p,
UCA 63-30-12 5,7.20
UCA 63-30-13 ' "io
UCA78-2-2(3)(j) 1
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
URCP 12(b)(6) 2 8




Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ?j 78-2-2(3)(]).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
In this appeal. Appellant claims that the bases upon which the district court's orders
were predicated were factually unsupported and legally infirm. In summary, the issues for
this Court's review are as follows:
1) Whether a claimant against the State of Utah has complied with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim provisions if her attorney, pursuant to verbal
instructions from a representative ol the State, filed the notice of claim with the Risk
Management Division of the State oi Utah (which has a full-time Assistant Attorney
General on staff and located in the division office), instead of the Attorney General's State
Capitol office.
2 i Whether it is reversible error for the district court to refuse to reconsider its
decision to grant a motion to dismiss after it has been shown that crucial factual conclusions
upon which the district court based its decision to dismiss arc demonstrably incorrect.
The standard of appellate review in this case is as follows:
Where a case is dismissed on the pleadings or on a motion for summary judgment,
the appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below. In
determining whether those facts require, as a matter of law. the entry oi' judgment for the
prevailing party below, the appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions
o\' law. which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross <v blue Shield w Slate, 779 p.2d 034
(Utah 1989); see also Neiderhauser bidets. & Dew Corp. w Campbell. 824 P.2d I 193 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); Schuriz w BMW of No. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991 ). Dismissal on
the pleadings or summary judgment arc not appropriate where there exist genuine issues ol
material fact. URCP 12; URCP 56(c); sec also. Bill Brown Realty. Inc. w Abbott. 562 P.2d
238 (Utah 1977).
STATEMENT OFTHE CASE
Nature of the case:
This appeal is from two orders of the First Judicial District Court. Hon. Gordon J.
Low presiding:
The first is the Order ol" Dismissal, in which the district court granted Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, which was based on Defendants" assertions that Plaintiff had not
complied with the notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
(Record on Appeal, hereafter R.. 236 - 238); found in the Appendix hereto as Exhibit A.
The second is the Order on Objection to Proposed Order. Motion for
Reconsideration or. Alternatively. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or to Set Aside
Judgment. (R. 233 - 235; found in the Appendix hereto as Exhibit B). Plaintiffs objected to
the entry ol an Order of Dismissal because the district court's Memorandum Decision, upon
which the Older of Dismissal was based, was founded on erroneous factual assertions
contained in an affidavit from the State that had not been made available to Plaintiff's
counsel. (R. 148- 151). In her Objection. Plaintiff pointed out the factual errors in the
affidavit, and requested that the district court reconsider its Memorandum Decision now that
the district court had been made aware of the truth. (R. 176- 186]. The district court
refused to do so. Reconsideration oi the decision m light of the existence of a correct
understanding o\ the facts would have led a rejection of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Statement of Facts:
On March 17. 1997. Plaintiff Amanda Thimmes was struck by a Utah State
University Utility truck, driven by Defendant Haven P. Hendricks, while she was a
pedestrian crossing in a crosswalk at the intersection of 700 East and U.S. 89 m Logan.
Utah. She sustained serious injuries as a result of this collision. <R. 4).
Plaintiff thereafter employed services of Robert B. Hart. Attorney at Law. to
prosecute her claims against Utah State University and Haven B. Hendricks. (R. 3).
On April 8. 1997. less than a month after than the accident. Mr. Hart's office sent a
letter to Jim Selandonakis at the Division ol" Risk Management, located at 5 120 State Office
Building. Salt Lake City. Utah, advising Mr. Selandonakis that the firm represented Ms.
Thimmes. and forwarding information to Mr. Selandonakis relating to Ms. Thimmes'
claims against Utah State University and Mr. Hendricks. (R. 52).
There ensued a series of communications and actions between Mr. Hart's office and
Mr. Selandonakis at the Utah Division of Risk Management. For example, two letters were
sent to Mr. Selandonakis from Mr. Hart's office on April 15. 1997. <R. 54. 56). another
letter was sent from Mr. Hart's office lo Mr. Sefaiidonakis on April 22, 1997. (R. 59).
another letter was sent from Mr. Hart's oUice to Mr. Selandonakis on May 20. 1997. (R.
61 I. and another letter was sent from Mr. Hart's office on May 21, 1997 (R. 6.T
During this time, the State Risk Management Division, under Mr. Selandonakis'
direction, made payments of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, as well as for
property damage. A letter scut to Mr. Halt's office from Mr. Selandonakis on May 27.
1997 acknowledged that the Stale had now paid S3.000 in Personal Injun Protection (PIP)
limits, and indicated that "I will await your demand package once vou complete it." (R. 65 i.
A letter from Mr. Hart's office to Mr. Sefaiidonakis. dated June 26. 1997, questioned the use
of PIP moneys to pay lor property damage. (R. 67).
In addition to the correspondence between Mr. Hart's office and Mr. Selandonakis.
there was telephone communication between Mr. Hart and Mr. Selandonakis as well. In at
least one of these conversations. Mr. Sefaiidonakis affirmed to Mr. Hart that the State of
Utah would not be denying liability on the part of Mr. Hendricks or Utah State Iiniversity.
because of the driver's obvious negligence (R. 74. 139).
By early February. 1998. Ms. Thimmes' claims against the State of Utah had not yet
been resolved, despite the verbal and written communications between her attorney and Mr.
Sefaiidonakis. Wishing to be in compliance with the notice ofclaim requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Mr. Hart instructed his paralegal. Barbara Reissen. lo
prepare a notice of claim lor Service on Utah State Untversit} and on the Utah Attorney
General's office. (R.75;R. 137- 140; R. 129- 130).
At that time, the statute regarding the filing of a notice of claim against the Stateof
Utah. UCA 63-30-12. read:
A claim against the state, or against its employee lor an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
tiled with the attorney general and the agency concerned within one war after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Section 63-30-1 1. regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as go\ernmental.
(The statute was amended in 1098 to require sen ice on the attorney general only.
deleting the requirement of service on "the agency concerned." See UCA 63-30-12. post-
1998 amendment).
The I'tah Attorney General has offices in various locations throughout the State of
Utah. In addition to the office of the Utah Attorney General, located at the State Capitol
Building (236 State Capitol), the Attorney General has an office located at 160 East 300
South. Salt Lake City, another at 515 East 100 South. Salt Lake City, another at 5272
College Drive. Murray, another at 341 South Mam, Salt Lake Citv. another at 5094 West
North Temple. Salt Lake City, another at 55 North University. Provo. and another at 2540
Washington Boulevard. Ogden. In addition, the Attorney General has attorneys
representing the Attorney General's office housed in office space with the state departments
whom the Attorney General represents. For example, the Attorney General has an office m
Logan. Utah, wherein an Assistant Attorney General assigned lo Utah State University has
an office at the Utah State University campus. The Utah Attorney General also has an
office located at 5120 Stale Office Buildirg. Salt Lake City. Utah, with the Division of Risk
Management. (R. 42-43).
Mr. Hart instructed his paralegal. Barbara Reissen. to contact the Attorney General's
office in order to ascertain whether service of the notice of claim on the Attorney General's
office required service at the address of the Utah Attorney General in the State Capitol
Building, or whether another person or party could accept service of the notice of claim on
the Attorney General's behalf. (R. 137-140; R. 129-130).
On or about February' I. 1998. as per Mr. Hart's instructions. Ms. Reissen called the
Utah Attorney General's office and asked who the notice of claim was to be sent to. Alter
being transferred from three different departments of the Attorney General's office, she
was ultimately told to send the notice of claim to Mr. Jim Selandonakis at the Risk
Management Division. The person with whom Ms. Reissen spoke confirmed to her that the
olfice to which she had instructed Ms. Reissen to send the notice of claim was a division of
the Attorney General's office (R. 129-130).
Based on this advice, on or about February 6. 1998. Ms. Reissen sent the notice of
claim to the Division of Risk Management, attention Jim Selandonakis. rather than to the
attention of the Assistant Attorney General at the Risk Management Division or to the
Attorney General's office in Ihe State Capitol. ( R. 132). (She also sent a notice of claim to
I'tah State Uni\ersity. attention George Emert. president of the University) (R. 129-132).
The notice of claim was received by the Risk Management Division on February 12. 1998.
(R. 136). It affirmed that "We have been communicating with Mr. Stelandonakis [sic]
regarding this claim and await your approval ov denial as outlined in UCA 63-30-14." <R.
70). Mr. Selandonakis did not review the notice of claim lor its compliance with Utah
statute that day. In fact, he did not review the notice for almost three months (R. 114. 115.
para. 62. I 16. para. 11).
On March 17. 1998. over a month after Mr. Hart's office sent the notice of claim to
the Risk Management Division, as instaicted. the one-year statutory period for filing the
notice of claim expired. See UCA 63-30-12 (pre-1998 amendments).
Nearly two months later, on May 6. 1998. Mr. Selandonakis received a letter from
Mr. Hart's office requesting payment for household services. Onlv then did Mr.
Selandonakis review the notice of claim to see if he could possibly use a defense in the case
that it didn't strictly comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. (R. 116. para 8).
He then spoke with Bruce Garner, the Assistant Attorney General whose offices are in the
Risk Management Division, about denying the claim based on non-compliance with the
statute. (R. 115. para 7; 116. paras. 10. 11; 121).
On or about May 21. 1998. Mr. Selandonakis called Mr. Hart's office and told Mr.
Hart's secretary- that because the notice of claim relative to Ms. Thimmes' case had not been
properly filed in the correct office, he was denvine the claim. Mr. Selandonakis did not
speak with Plaintiff's counsel. Robert Hart, on this occasion. <R. 116. R. 189-190. R. 192-
194).
On June 9. 1998. Mr. Hart sent a letter to Mr. Selandonakis explaining that he had
complied with the notice of claim requirements, because a representative of the State had
specifically directed his paralegal to file the notice of claim for the Attorney General's
office with the Division of Risk Management. (R. 74--76; 192-194; 190). Mr.
Selandonakis did not reply to that letter.
On January 11. 1999. Ms. Thimmes' Complaint was filed against Utah State
University and Haven B. Hendricks, inter alia. (R. 1- 6).
On March 2. 1999. the Attorney General's office tiled its Motion to Dismiss under
URCP 12(b)(6). arguing that Plaintiff had not complied with the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements. (R. 10 31).
Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss, and moved the district court to treat the
motion as a motion lor Summary Judgment. Plaintiff further requested that the district conn
allow discovery to be undertaken on the facts underlying the motion in accordance with
URCP .^6(11. (R. 40-76). In opposition to tins motion. Defendants argued that no further
lacts needed to be adduced, and that the district court could issue a decision without further
lacts. (R. 81-89). Plaintiff replied that discovery was necessary morder to uncover the
truth about whether Plaintiffs counsel's office had been misled by a representative ofthe
State. (R. 90-97).
A hearing on Defendants' motion was held on Monday. June 28. 1999. At that
hearing, the district court instructed the parties to supplement the briefing in this case with
affidavits from Mr. Hart and his paralegal, as well as from Bruce Garner and Mr.
Selandonakis. (R. 113).
Plaintiffs' counsel supplemented the record with the affidavits of Mr. Hart and Ms.
Reissen. In heraffidavit, Ms. Reissen confirmed that she was employed by Mr. Hart in
February. 1998. and affirmed that at Mr. Hart's direction, she contacted the Utah State
Attorney General's office and asked who the notice of claim was to be sent to. She stated
that she was instructed by a representative of the Attorney General's office to send the
notice of claim to Mr. Jim Selandonakis at the Risk Management Division. Ms. Reissen
stated unequivocally that the person with whom she spoke confirmed to her that the office
to which she had instructed Ms. Reissen to send the notice of claim was a division ol the
Attorney General's office, and that based on the information provided to her bv this
representative. Ms. Reissen sent the notice of claim to Mr. Sefaiidonakis. (R. 129-130).
Mr. Hart's affidavit confirmed that he has practiced law in the State of Utah for 17
years, and that he had experience in suing the State of Utah. He indicated that he was
familiar with the requisites of the Governmental Immunity Act. and had complied with
them in the past. He further testified that in this case, he instructed his paralegal to confinn
yvith the Attorney General's office the exact location to which the Attorney General's copy
of the notice of claim should be sent. He also stated that after Ms. Reissen had confirmed to
him that the Attorney General's office had instructed her to send the notice of claim to the
address given to her. (R. 137-140).
Defendants also filed supplemental material with the district court. It was as
interesting in yvhat it did not contain as for the misleading statements it did contain. For
example. Defendants adduced no evidence that Mr. Hart's paralegal. Ms. Reissen. had not
been instructed by the staff at the Attorney General's Office or the Risk Management
Division to file the notice of claim with the Risk Management Division. In fact. Defendants
did not dispute either Ms. Reissen's or Mr. Hart's recitation of the facts in that regard.
What Defendants' supplemental brief did say yvas misleading and false, however. It
contained an affidavit from Mr. Selandonakis. in yvhich he made assertions that were simply
untrue. Unfortunately, the district court ultimately relied on these untrue assertions.
Paragraph 12 of the Sefaiidonakis affidavit states. "I did not wail for the statute of
limitations to run before I advised the Plaintiffs counsel that the notice of claim was
deficient. When I received the notice of claim, the Plaintiff still had approximately one
month to comply with the statute and I had no reason to think that counsel would not do so."
(R. I 17). By making this statement, it was obvious that Mr. Sefaiidonakis intended the
district court to believe that he notified Plaintiffs counsel that his notice of claim yvas
deficient at least a month before the one-year notice of claim statute ran - in plenty of time
for Plaintiffs counsel to remedy any deficiency. In fact, this was what the district court
ended up believing, as discussed infra. This statement was not true, however. According to
Mr. Selandonakis' other affidavit testimony, he did not contact Mr. Hart before the one-vcar
statute ran to tell him that the notice was defective. In fact. Mr. Selandonakis
acknowledged m his affidavit that he was not even aware of any alleged detect in the notice
of claim until after the one-year statute expired. (R, 116. paras. 8 - 11 i.
Unfortunately. Plaintiff s counsel did not receive a copy of the Selandonakis
affidavit or any other portion of Defendants' supplemental brief at the time it was sent to the
district court, and thus did not have a chance to reply lo factual issues raised therein before
the district court issued its decision.
On September 14. the district court issued a Memorandum Decision, setting forth the
facts and the law upon which the Stale's motion should be granted. <R. 148 - 131; found in
the Appendix hereto as Exhibit C). In the Memorandum Decision, the district court relied
specifically on the "affidavit filed by the State." (the Selandonakis affidavit) which,
according to the court, indicated that "the deficiency |in the notice of claim] was brought to
the attention of Plaintiffs counsel a month prior to the deadline for filing, thereby allowing
sufficient time for resubmitting the notice in compliance with the statute." (R. 1SO;
emphasis added). Thus, the district court found inapplicable the precedent of bischel v.
Mernti. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 19951. discussed infra, yvhich held that a plaintiff had
complied with the notice of claim requirements when the plaintiff's counsel sent a notice to
the wrong county office after being instructed to do so bv a county representative.
The district court's Memorandum Decision placed two immediate problems before
Plaintiff. First, the "fact" from the State's affidavit upon which the district court had relied
yvas not true. Second, because Plaintiff's counsel had not been served with a copy of this
affidavit, the district court's Memorandum Decision was the first notice that Plaintiff had of
the affidavit's existence.
Plaintiffs counsel quickly procured a copy of the affidavit, as well as the other
supplementary material filed by Defendants. (R. 187 - 188). Meanwhile, Defendants sent a
proposed order dismissing Plaintiffs action. (See R. 196:.
On October 1. 1999. Plaintiff filed an Objection to Proposed Order. Motion for
Reconsideration or. alternatively, to Alter or Amend Judgment or to Set Aside Judgment,
pointing out that Plaintiffs counsel had not received the State's supplementary material
until after the district court had issued its Memorandum Decision. The Objection also
pointed out that the assertions of Mr. Sefandonakis' affidavit, upon which the district court
relied in its memorandum decision, were false. The Objection further set forth a detailed
chronology of events, demonstrating that Mr. Sefandonakis had not told Mr. Hart that his
notice of claim was defective before the one-year statutory notice of claim period expired,
and that in lact Mr. Sefandonakis was unaware of any claimed delect in the notice until lorn:
after the statutory period had run. In light of these facts. Plaintiff requested that the district
court reconsider its ruling as set forth in the Memorandum Decision. (R. 152 - 194).
Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiff s Objection (R. 207 - 210). to which
Plaintiff replied on November 12, 1999. Thereafter, the district court filed a second
Memorandum Decision, denying Plaintiff's motion (R. 231 -- 232; found in the Appendix
hereto as Exhibit D). ). In that decision, the district court characterized the exchanges and
allegations between counsel regarding the service of the Sefandonakis affidavit on
Plaintiffs counsel as "unfortunate." but concluded that in any case, even if the facts were
"taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, [they] still would not suffice as service or
result m an enlargement of the bischel approach." (R. 231). The district court's decision to
dismiss Plaintiffs case thus remained unchanged.
On December 6. the district court entered an Order of Dismissal (R. 236-238 i and an
Order on Objection to Proposed Order. Motion tor Reconsideration or. Alternatively.
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or to Set Aside Judgment. (R. 233-235 i.
This appeal was taken from both orders. (R. 241-243).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs counsel served the notice of claim precisely
as his office was instructed by a representative of the State. Under these circumstances.
Utah ease law and public policy mandate a determination that Plaintiff complied with the
notice of claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
2. In deciding to dismiss Plaintiffs case, the district court based its decision
on its understanding that Jim Sefandonakis. of the Utah Division of Risk Management
had warned Plaintiffs counsel that the notice of claim was defective at least a month
before the one-year statutory deadline for filing that notice had expired. That
understanding was erroneous, and was based on false representations by Mr.
Selandonakis. who didn't look at the notice of claim to determine statutory compliance
until after (he deadline ran. The district court erred in refusing to reconsider and change




UNDER UTAH CASE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY. PLAINTIFF
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BY FILING HER NOTICE OP
CLAIM PRECISELY AS DIRECTED BY DEFENDANTS'
REPRESENTATIVE. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT ON THI- BASIS OE NON
COMPLIANCE WITH THI- NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUTE.
While the law of the State of Utah is quite clear that compliance with the notice of
claim statute is necessary in order to bring an action against a governmental entity, it is
equally clear that the public policy of the State of Utah precludes a governmental entity
Irom misleading a party into serving a notice of claim on the wrong office and thereafter
attempting to use the result of its misrepresentations as a valid defense lo an action brought
against it. To the contrary, both the case law and public policy mandate that notices sent
under such circumstances comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The case ofbischel v. Merrill. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) is directly on point in
this regard. In Bischel, the Salt Lake Count}' Attorney's office actively pursued settlement
ol the plaintiffs claim. The plaintiffs counsel sent a notice ofclaim to the county
attorney's office, claiming that he had been told by a member of the staff at the countv
commission's office that the notice of claim should be sent to the county attorney's office.
After the complaint had been filed, the count}' moved the district court to dismiss the case,
arguing that it had been sent to the wrong office, and that in anycase, the secretary at the
count)' attorney's office was not authorized to accept service of a notice of claim.
This Court overturned the lower court's dismissal of the case, holding that the public
policy of the State of Utah could not countenance such conduct by the government, and
stating. "It appeal's at best disingenuous for the County to argue that Bischel's notice was
inadequate merely because she directed and delivered it as the County Commission and
Count}' Attorney's Office instructed. The public deserves more consistent, more credible
treatment from its servants." Id. at 279. This Court also found that in an}' case, the notice
of claim directed to the County Attorney's Office '"fulfilled the purpose of the notice
requirement." inasmuch as it was the County Attorney's Office that yvas "entrusted with
investigating and settling or defending the claim." Id. at 27H. This Court went on to sav
that "[directing and delivering her notice of claim to the County Attorney's Office in no
way inhibited settling Bischel's claim without resort to litigation. In fact, given the powers
and responsibilities the County has bestowed upon the County Attorney's Office, the
opposite is true, (citation omitted]. Filing notice yvith the County Attorney's Office
facilitated settlement discussions. Indeed, the County Attorney's Office actively pursued
settlement of Bischel's claim, even paying her property damage." Id. at 279-280.
The bischel decision is only the latest in a long line of cases holding that a
governmental entity may not mislead a claimant or claimant's attorney as to the
requirements of the notice of claim and then successfully assert noncompliance with the
requisites of the statute as a defense. See Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d I 125. 1129
(Utah 1992) (" While a party may be excused for failing topursue a claim if the party acted
in reasonable reliance on a defendant's representations, absent any representations by the
defendant, a plaintiff must take reasonable steps to prosecute the claim.") (emphasis added).
See also, generally. Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) ("One cannot
justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security, thereby subjecting his
claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that verydelay as a defense to the
action when brought.")
Application of these principles of equity and fairness to the facts in this case
mandates a determination that Plaintiff complied with the notice of claim requirements of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that when Ms. Reissen. Plaintiffs counsel's
paralegal, telephoned the Utah Attorney General's office in order to find out specifically
where the notice of claim should be sent, she yvas directed to send it to Mr. Sefandonakis
at the Division of Risk Management, located in the State Office Building. It is
undisputed that an Assistant Attorney General has an office in the Division of Risk
Management. It is also undisputed that Ms. Reissen was told that the office to which she
was directed to send the notice of claim was a division of the Attorney General's office.
{See R. 129). It is further undisputed that had Ms. Reissen not been specifically
instructed to send the notice of claim to the Risk Management Division's office,
addressed to Mr. Sefandonakis. Plaintiff's counsel would have sent the notice of claim to
the mam office of the Attorney General at 236 State Capitol. Salt Lake City. Utah, as
Plaintiffs counsel had done in other cases he had brought against the State. (See R. 139.
para.7).
The tact that this evidence is uncontroverted is sufficient lo establish its
truthfulness for purposes of determining compliance yvith the Governmental Immunity
Act. See. e.g.. bischel, 907 P.2d at 281. dissent footnote 1. confirming that this Court
found compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act upon the uncontroverted
affidavit testimony of plaintiff s counsel: "Bischel's attorney merely alleged that an
unidentified receptionist told him to file a notice with McDonald [a representative of the
Salt Lake County Attorney's office] in the Count}' Attorney's office." See also beck v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795. at 802 (Utah 1985) ("In the absence of responsive
affidavits, we take the assertions of the affidavits as true and view all unexplained facts in
a light most favorable to [the plaintiff] i."
It is also undisputed that there existed an extensive history of negotiations between
Plaintiffs counsel and the Division of Risk Management, the governmental entity entrusted
with investigating and settling or determining to defend Plaintiffs claim, long before the
expiration of the one-year statutory period for filing a notice of claim. (See, e g.. R. 52-67).
It is undisputed that Mr. Sefandonakis had told Mr. Hart that the State did not intend to
assert a defense to liability (R. 139). and that as part of the settlement process he had written
to Mr. Hart. "I will await your demand package once you complete it." (R. 65). The notice
of claim itself is indicative of the ongoing process of negotiating the claim, indicating
therein that "We have been communicating with Mr. Stefandonakis [sic] regarding this
claim and await your approval or denial as outlined in UCA 63-30-14." (R. 70). It is also
clear that Mr. Sefandonakis received actual notice of claim before the statutory one-year
period ran. (R. 115). It is further uncontroverted that Mr. Sefandonakis did not
communicate to Mr. Hart that there might be any problem with service of the notice of
claim before the one-year notice of claim statute ran. In fact, it is clear that Mr.
Sefandonakis did not review the notice of claim for statutory compliance until after the one-
year statute had run. (See R. 115-1 16, paras. 6-8. 11).
In light of these undisputed facts, it is clear that Plaintiffcomplied with the notice of
claim requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, as interpreted in the
aforementioned cases. The governmental entity entrusted with investigating and settling or
defending the claim received the actual and requisite notice of the claim loim within the
one-year period. Plaintiffs counsel served the notice of claim, precisely as his paralegal
had been instructed to do. complying with the statute's form and content requirements and
in a timely manner, finder the policy of the precedents cited above. Plaintiff "strictly
complied with the statute and with the [Statej's instructions." bischel, supra, at 279.
The only material distinction between the cases referenced above and the instant case
is that this case deals with the filing of a notice of claim with the State, while the above-
cited cases deal with the filing of a notice of claim with a countv or other governmental
entity. This is a distinction without a difference, however. The same principles of equity
and fairness apply equally to citi/ens. whether the}' are seeking redress for injuries from a
local govemmenial entity or from a state governmental entity. It is no more acceptable for a
state actor to mislead a citi/en as to whether his service of a notice of claim complies with
the strict requirements of service on "the attorney general" (UCA 63-13-1 1). than it is tor a
local governmental actor to mislead a citi/en as to whether service of a notice of claim on a
countv attorney complies with the requirements to file a notice of claim on "the governing
bod}' of the political subdivision." UCA 63-30-1 3. It is no more acceptable for the State of
Utah to argue that a plaintiff has tailed to comply with a notice of claim statute where that
plaintill directs and delivers a notice of claim precisely as instructed bv a representative of
the State, than it is for a local government entity to make the same argument where the
claimant plaintiff delivers a notice of claim precisely as instructed by a representative of the
county. The public deserves no less consistent, credible treatment from its state servants
than from its other public servants.1
Under these circumstances, it was error lor the district court to dismiss Plaintiff's
case. This Court should overturn the district court's dismissal, and the case remanded for
further proceedings on the merits.
II.
IT WAS ERROR EOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO REFUSE TO
RECONSIDER OR OTHERWISE; RELIEVE PLAINTIEE PROM ITS
DECISION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS CASE AFTER PLAINTIEE HAD
SHOWN THAT THE FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH THE DECISION
WAS BASED WAS DEMONSTRABLY FALSE.
As pointed out above, due to an unfortunate series of events, the district court was
misled as to critical lacts regarding Plaintiff's counsel's compliance with the notice of claim
statute.
The first of these was a false statement contained in the affidavit of Mr.
Sefandonakis. which led the district court lo believe that at least a month before the one-
In this regard, it is noteworthy that -iince this case was brought, the Utah legislature
simplified compliance with the notice of claim statute, now requiring that a notice ofclaim
be directed only to the Attorney Cieneral's office, instead of also requiring that a notice also
be directed to the state entity that is also claimed to be responsible for the injuries. See
UCA 63-30-12 (post-1998 amendments). This legislative change is indicative ofa policy to
make the pursuance ofgrievances against the State easier, and lo uncomphcale procedures
for filing a notice of claim. See. e.g.. Hackford v. I'tah Power &Fight, 740 P.2d 1281.
I2S4-I2S."> (Utah 1992)(Legislature presumed to be aware of legal and policy consequences
of its acts).
20
year statutory notice of claim deadline ran. Mr. Sefandonakis told Mr. Hart that the notice ol
claim was statutorily defective."
The second of these yvas the failure i)f the Attorney General's office to serve Mr.
Sefandonakis' affidavit and its accompanying documents on Plaintiff's counsel before the
district court issued its memorandum decision."
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, it was only after Plaintiffs counsel received a
As pointed out in the recitation of facts, infra. Paragraph 12 of the Sefandonakis
affidavit states. "I did not wait for the statute of limitations to run before I advised the
Plaintiffs counsel that the notice of claim was deficient. When I received the notice of
claim, the Plaintiff still had approximately one month to comply yvith the statute and I had
no reason to think that counsel would not do so." iR. 117). Mr. Sefandonakis apparently
intended that the district court should believe that he notified Plaintiffs counsel that his
notice i)f claim was deficient at least a month before the one-year notice of claim statute ran
- in plenty of time for Plaintiffs counsel to reined}' any deficiency. This yvas not the case,
however. In fact. Mr. Sefandonakis acknowledged in his affidavit that he was not even
aw are of any claimed defect in the notice of claim until after the one-vear statute had run.
(R. 116. paras. 8 -- 11).
In the Memorandum Decision issued September 14. 1998. (R. 148 - LSI: attached
hereto as Exhibit C) the district court made it clear that it had relied on Mr. Selandonakis'
representation that he had advised Mr. Hart that the notice of claim was deficient before the
statutory notice of claim statute ran. In the opinion, the district court specificalh' referenced
the '•affidavit filed by the State." (the Sefandonakis affidavit) yvhich. according to the court,
indicated that "the deficiency' [in the notice of claim] was brought to the attention of
Plaintiffs counsel a month prior lo the deadline lor filing, thereby allowing sufficient time
for resubmitting the notice in compliance with the statute." (R. 150; emphasis added].
The facts and circumstances surrounding this issue were treated at length in
Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order. Motion for Reconsideration or. alternatively, to
Amend Judgment or to set aside Judgment fR. 176-186). the Affidavit of Randall K.
Edwards (R. 187-188) the Affidavit of Robert B. Hart (R. 189-191 land the Reply in
Support of Objection (R. 21 1-218). Plaintiffs counsel Edwards and Hart swore under
oath that the}' had not received the affidavits. Defense counsel claimed the affidavits had
been sent. Ultimately, the district court made no determination on whether the affidavits
copy of the district court's Memorandum Decision that he became aware of the affidavit,
which he quickly procured from defense counsel. (R. IS'? - 188). In the Objection to
Proposed Order. Motion for Reconsideration or. Ahcriiativeiy. to Alter or Amend Judgment
or to Set Aside Judgment. Plaintiffs counsel demonstrated that the assertions of Mr.
Selandonakis' affidavit, upon which the district court relied in its memorandum decision,
were false, something Plaintiffs counsel did not know until the Memorandum Decision had
been filed. In light of these facts. Plaintiff requested that the district court reconsider the
conclusions in its Memorandum Decision. (R. 152- 194).
The district court refused to do so. however, issuing a second Memorandum
Decision stating that even if ihe facts were ""taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff.
Jtbeyj still would not suffice as service or result in an enlargement of the bischel approach."
(R. 231).
The district court's conclusion is erroneous for at least two reasons:
First, justice and equity required that the district court reconsider and change its
decision to dismiss Plaintiff's case once it became aware that its understanding of the facts
Irom Mr. Selandonakis" affidavit was incorrect and that the lacts were, indeed, exactly-
opposite to what the court had understood. See URCP 60(b). providing that the court may.
in the furtherance of justice, relieve a parte or his legal representative from an order for
reasons of mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or misrepresentation by an adverse




Second, the totality of all of the lacts. including the uncontroverted testimony of Ms.
Reissen and Mr. Hart, discussed supra, as well as the correct understanding of the facts in
Mr. Sefandonakis' affidavit, when taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, should have
led the district court to conclude that Plaintiff had strictly complied yvith the requirements of
the notice of claim statute, for the reasons set forth in the first legal argument set forth
above. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside its decision to dismiss the case because that decision was the result of a judicial error,
or "mistake of law." See bischel. supra, at 277 (Judicial error or mistake of law bv trial
court supports a Rule 60(b) motion): see also. Udv v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097. 1099 (Utah App.
1995).
In the instant case, once it had been shown to the district court what the facts were, it
should have reconsidered and changed its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should overturn the distnct court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs case and remand the case for further proceedings on the merits.
is If*DATED th //- dav of /?,q*-. . 2000.
* J
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN. P.C.




EXHIBIT A-Order of Dismissal (R. 236-238)
EXHIBIT B -Order On Obiection to Proposed Order. Motion lor Reconsideration
or. Alternatively. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or to Set Aside
Judgment (R. 233-235)
EXHIBIT C - Memorandum Decision: September 14. 1998 (R. 148-15 1i
EXHIBIT D- Memorandum Decision: November 12. 1998 (R. 231-232)
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PROPOSED ORDER, MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT OR TO
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
e uoracn
matter came before the Court on Plaint cm ec
•"*" ae r *i ~'
er or Anv
:ow--a the rem
its Momorandu;n Deci si
:. Set As; do .r
a and a;' 1; dav.
-r good cause ar>th
53 3 £<HiB/r "B
Cl _ .. . 1 -
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1- Ihe pia jijt.i ii 's Obiection to Proposed Ordei , Motion 1or
s aac;:ne:it o: to Set As :oe Judgment is denied.
DATED this d av c f Novemb^ r,
BY THE COURT:
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UTAH SI ATI- UN1VFRSITV
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 40() 100050
Jud«c Cordon J. LOW
THIS MAT'IT! R comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Said motion is
supported n\ memorandum. Plaintiff tiled her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, together with, Defendant's Motion to "1 real Motion to Dismiss as Motion tor
Summan Judgment and Motion tor Continuance. IIa\ ing considered the foregoiniz. the Court
now issues this Memorandum Decision.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss prays the Court to dismiss this action because Plaintiff
huied to provide statutory notice under 1'tab's Go\ erninental Immunity Act. l.'tah Code Ann. sv
03-3U-13 ( 199Si.
Plaintiff tiled a Complaint with this Court on January 11. 1{)07. seeking recover) for
injuries sustained when she was struck bv a I tan State I mversity utiht\ truck on Marc hi i ~.
U>9~. On March. 3. 1999. Defendant tiled a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff tailed to
satisfv statinor\ notice requirements of ^ oA30-l 3 U.C.A. ( 1998) by submitting a Notice o;'
Claim not with the State Attorney General, but with the Division of Risk Management and I 'tab
State Uni\ers;t\. Defendant's obiection rested on the requirement of I "tah Code Ann. ^ o3-3<i-13
11908) that a Notice of Claim be submitted to the Attorney General where the State is a part.
<'n March 25. U>99. Plaintift'tiled an ()pposition u> Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, reb- ing in
large part on Bischel \. Merritt 9(P |\A: 2"5 U tab Ct. App 1995) and the Utah. Court ^f
Appeals" discussion regarding serving notice on the go\ erninental entities.
The Usue before this Court is whether Piainurr s torm of notice i^ satisfactory under




therefore be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction, as per Lamarr v. Utah Dep't. ol"Transp_.. 828 P.2d
535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
I Tah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b) (1998) provides that "[t]he notice of claim shall be . . .
directed and delivered to . . . the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah."
.Absent any indication to the contrary, the statute is clear that notice must be given to the attorney
general-not to the Division of Risk Management, not to the University of Utah, nor to anv other
person or department except for the attorney general herself. It is undisputed that Plaintiff tailed
to do so. I hereiore the conclusion rests on any further illumination that mav exist.
Plaintiff justifies the form of notice by appealing to Bischel. However. Bischel is fatallv
distinguishable on a number of points, hirst, Bischel concerned submitting a notice ofclaim on a
count) . While not in an of itself problematic, it becomes an important distinction when seen in
the context ot the 1995 Amendments, which were the basis of the Bischel notice issue. The 1993
.Amendments to Utah Code Ann. vj 65-30-1 1 do not specify where notice should be submitted.
Rather, they cross-reference Utah Code Ann § 63-30-15. which merely states that "fa] claim
against a political subdivision ... is barred unless notice ol claim is tiled with the eoverninL'
body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim arises." Bischel at 277 (quotmu.
I tah Code Ann. i; 63-30-13). In other words, the language of the 1993 Amendments lacks
.specificity as applied to Bischel. but which is not the problem, in the instant case. The statute is
clear: notice must be submittec to the attorney general. Absent such notice, this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
Second, the Court of Appeals in Bischel felt that the purposes of the notice pro\ ision
were satisfied. I his is inapplicable in the present case, again because the statute is clear. I he-
statute simply does not recognize notice except to the attorney general. This is not a mere
expression of legislative will; rather, it is a clear statutory mandate. The argument that the
statute s general purposes are met cannot provide a basis for deviation from the clear legislative
language.
Ibird, the courts have treated the Governmental Immunity Act with particular deiicacv.
Absent a rare exception in an unrefined statute such as in the Bischel case, the courts follow a
pattern ot stiict compliance with the act. So doing results in the same conclusion; notice ua--
lmproper.
U°f
Fourth, while policy considerations might lean in lavor of not dismissing a case where
actual notice exists simply due to a procedural flaw, similar considerations favor requiring parties
to meet simple statutory guidelines to ensure that notice is received and claims do not mire the
wrong divisions, departments or individuals in the various government entities.
In addition to the above, the affidavit tiled bv the state makes it clear that notice was not
on!> statutorily insufficient but actually not provided to the attorney general. Further, the
deficiency was brought to the attention of Plaintiffs counsel a month prior to the deadline for
filing, therebv allowing sufficient time for resubmitting the notice in compliance with the statute.
The Plaintiff has argued that the spirit of the Bischel opinion provides this Court with sutticient
latitude to waive strict compliance and accept jurisdiction. The Court will not take that liberty
with the statute on the Bischel language ands such relief will have to be obtained, if at all. from
the Bischel Court.
for tiie foregoing reasons, this Court has no jurisdiction and Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is granted.
JT
Dated this/V dav of'September. ! 999
/Z0
__..trordon J. Low /Ya.^ ^•••••. <-//~-
District Court Jude-d/1^ ••''.*cT«£&J'"-^<A%
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This matter is before the Court an Objection to Proposed Order. Motion for Reconsideration
or. Alternatively. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or to Set Aside Judgment, all brought b> the
Plaintiff'. The exchange of pleadings raise a number of concerns respecting the issuance of an earlier
Memorandum Decision and Order by the Court.
The exchanges and allegations between counsel are unfortunate but demonstrate vvhv strict
compliance to the statute is required. The facts surrounding the "providing" ot notice are much in
dispute, and if taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, still would not suffice as service or
result in an enlargement of the Bischel approach. Expansion of the Bischel doctrine in this Court's
view is inappropriate.
for the above reasons and more specifically those set forth in the Defendant's response, the
motion is denied. Counsel for the Defendant directed to prepare a formal order in conformance
herewith.
•L
Dated the /yVtfav of November. 1999
BY THE OtiTTCI
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